Since December 2019, Alberto Fernandez has been trying to restructure his $100 billion debt to private bondholders and US$45 billion loaned by Macri to the International Monetary Fund.  According to Reuters, the case should be particularly important in cases where creditors are asked to accept a substantial reduction in debt and debt service, although, given the particular circumstances of the Elliot/NML case, it is not clear that it applies generally to holdouts in other restructurings.  The American Bankers Association warned that the District Court`s interpretation of the equal conditions provisions could allow a single creditor to prevent the implementation of a sustained international restructuring plan, undermining decades of U.S. efforts to promote a cooperative settlement of sovereign debt crises.  In addition, the second circle found that the court`s injunctions did not violate Argentina`s sovereign immunity, simply because they imposed a ban on the formal and informal subordination of part of the debt to other debts: “They do not place, arrest or execute property…. the injunctions do not ask Argentina to pay a sum of money; Nor do they limit the other uses on which Argentina can use its tax reserves. In other words, the orders do not confer any power or control over the high property of the court.  The payment was used to eliminate payments payable in 2006 ($5.1 billion), 2007 ($4.6 billion) and 2008 ($432 million). This amounted to 8.8% of Argentina`s public debt and reduced the central bank`s reserves by one-third (from $28 billion to $18.6 billion). According to the official announcement, it also saved about $1 billion in interest, although the actual savings amounted to $842 million (since the BIS`s reserves were previously paid in interest).  One of the largest individual investors in Argentine bonds after Venezuela bought a total of more than $5 billion in restructured Argentine bonds between 2005 and 2007.  “We are a little surprised by this,” said Carl Ross, a partner in the gMO fund manager who participated in the negotiations.
“A normal development is that a country, after restructuring its debt, is generally on a better path.” The economic recovery finally allowed Argentina to offer large-scale debt swets in 2005 and 2010; the first yielded 76% of the default bonds and the second, 91.3%.  The terms of the bond exchange were not accepted by all private creditors; Holders of approximately 7% of the bonds being cancelled, known as “holdouts,” continued to aspire to a full refund.Ha tetszett oszd meg másokkal is: